

# Impact of suboptimal design features in the EU ETS


- Allocation in the electricity market -

22 May 2007

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Ea Energy Analyses


[www.eaea.dk](http://www.eaea.dk)

# ETS: Impact on spot market dispatch



# ETS: Impact on investments

*Long-run marginal costs of electricity generation*



# Impacts of emissions trading on the electricity sector (optimal design)

- Spot market

- Ensures efficient CO2 reduction



- Investments

- Provides incentive to invest in low carbon technologies



# Project outline

- **Goal:** Assess **impact of free allocation to new entrants** in the EU ETS
- **Scope:** Investments in the North European Electricity Market in years 2006 – 2022
- **Methodology:** Use of Partial Equilibrium model
- **Output:** Investment impact, emissions, electricity prices, welfare economy
- **Funded by:** Danish Environmental Protection Agency

*NAPs for 2005-7*

# Allocation to new entrants


.... is an investment subsidy potentially affecting investors' decisions regarding:

- What technology to choose
- Where investments are situated
- When investments are made

Market distortion => Welfare economic losses

# What technology?


*Long-run marginal costs of electricity generation*




Modelling results

# Investments by fuel

Reference



New entrants




WIND NAT\_GAS COAL Already existing



# Where investments are made?

Coal CHP


CO<sub>2</sub>-price: 20 €/ton




Coal CHP: Share of total capital cost covered by CO<sub>2</sub>-allocation

# Geographical distribution of investments (1)

Reference - 2022




New\_entrants - 2022





# Geographical distribution of investments (2)

Reference - 2022




New\_entrants - 2022



# When investments are made?

*Rule of thumb:*

*In an underinvested market the electricity price will increase until it reaches the LRM of a new power plant*



# Allocation to new entrants distorts the market

- Spot market

- Ensures efficient CO<sub>2</sub> reduction



- Investments

- What? Incentive towards coal/lignite
- Where? Investment move to countries allocating generously
- When? Investments are moved forward in time



# Welfare economic consequences

Norway	
10 €/t:	158
20 €/t:	118
30 €/t:	-10

Sweden	
10 €/t:	-187
20 €/t:	-252
30 €/t:	-42

Finland	
10 €/t:	18
20 €/t:	62
30 €/t:	184

Denmark	
10 €/t:	-134
20 €/t:	-211
30 €/t:	-325


Germany	
10 €/t:	-694
20 €/t:	-4.403
30 €/t:	-15.578

Total	
10 €/t:	-839
20 €/t:	-4.685
30 €/t:	-15.771

Mill. Euro

# CO<sub>2</sub>-price with fixed cap

no allocation to new entrants



# Conclusions on new entrant allocation

- Even more investments in coal power capacity
- Investments move to Germany
- Lower electricity prices
  - Consumers benefit in the short term
  - Existing electricity producers lose
- CO<sub>2</sub>- prices will increase to an extent where the subsidy-effect exceeds the total cost.
- Welfare-economic loss 25% of investment
- 2<sup>nd</sup> order effects not analysed, e.g. impacts on the carbon price